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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: "UNDER COLOR OF" LAW AND
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
T HE Ku KLUX ACT of 187I,l largely embodied in present federal
civil rights legislation, provides a civil remedy in the federal courts for
deprivation of constitutional rights by anyone acting "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Terri-
tory .... "2 The United States Supreme Court recently held in Monroe
v. Pape' that acts of a. state official while performing his duties, even if
unauthorized by state law, are actions taken "under color of" law within
the meaning of this Civil Rights Act.4 When a state official violates
federal constitutional rights by conduct which constitutes state action but
is unauthorized by state law, a civil action normally is available against
him in the state courts. Under the Monroe decision, if the official's
conduct violates the Civil Rights Act,5 then a civil action will also lie
against him in the federal courts6 despite the availability of a state court
remedy.
'An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, and for other Purposes x7 Stat. 13 (187). Sections x, 2, and 6,
of the Ku Klux Act are incorporated with minor changes in present federal civil rights
legislation. Section i is now REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), z2 U.S.C. § 1983 (958)
(civil action for deprivation of rights), § a is now REV. STAT. § .980 (1875), 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (1958) (action for conspiracy to interfere with civil rights), and § 6
is now REV. STAT. § 1981 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1958) (action for failure to
prevent interference with civil rights).
2 "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress." REV. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (958).
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
4 1d. at 172.
5 REv. STAT. § 1979 (875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958) of the present Civil Rights
Act primarily protects rights secured against state action by the fourteenth amendment.
Such rights include freedom of religious worship, freedom of lawful assembly, freedom
of the press, freedom from unlawful search and seizure, and freedom from arbitrary
discrimination. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (-943); Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (939) ; Jackson v. Duke, 259 F.2d 3 (sth Cir. 1958) ; cases
collected in x BARRON & HOLrzoFP, FEDERAL PRACriCE AND PROCEDURE § 37, at 198-
zoo (rev. ed. z96o) 5 cf. Hunt v. Arnold, 17z F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ga. x959); Lopez
v. Seccombe, 71 F. Supp. 769 (S.D. Cal. 194+). See also note 46 infra.
o The federal district courts have original jurisdiction of actions brought under the
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
In the Monroe case, a resident of Chicago" brought an action in the
federal district court against certain Chicago policemen and the City of
Chicago to recover damages under the present Civil Rights Acte for an
alleged deprivation of his federal constitutional rights "under color of"
law. The plaintiff alleged that thirteen Chicago police officers, during
the course of their employment, broke into his home, insulted and beat
him, and without a warrant searched his home and arrested and detained
him incommunicado. Such conduct is unlawful under the constitution
and laws of Illinois.' The district court held that the complaint did not
state a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act.10 The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Assigning few reasons for its
decision," the court relied heavily on the availability of a remedy at
state law.' The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the dismissal of
the complaint against the City of Chicago, but held in an eight-to-one
decision that it was error to dismiss the complaint against the individual
police officers. 3
Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a majority of the Court, held
that "under color of" law, as used in the Civil Rights Act, includes abuse
of official position, even if unauthorized by state law.' 4 The majority
opinion relied on a line of authority which construes "under color of"
law as used in the criminal provisions of the act as including a misuse of
Civil Rights Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1958). See x BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 37 (rev. ed. 196o) 5 cf. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 4960939).
"Plaintiffs were Mr. Monroe, his wife, and their six children represented by their
mother as next friend.
REV. STAT. § -979 (.875), 42 U.S.C. § x983 (958). Originally, the complaint
also invoked REv. STAT. §§ i980-8i (1875), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86 (1958). How-
ever, argument before the Supreme Court was limited to § 1983.
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violatedi and no warrant shall
issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 6. Illinois
law also provides criminal penalties for illegal detention and for prevention of con-
sultation with attorney or family while being held in custody. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§§ 252, 449.-1 (957).
"oMonroe v. Pape, 27z F.ad 365 (7th Cir. x959).
Id. at 366.
"Tort actions against police officers for assault and battery and false imprisonment
are available in the Illinois state courts. See, e.g., Fulford v. O'Connor, 3 Ill. 2d 490,
121 N.E.2d 767 (z954); Sparacino v. Ferona, s Ill. App. ad 227, 117 N.E.ad 320
(1954); Raucci v. Connelly, 340 Ill. App. 28o, 91 N.E.ad 735 (1950).
"Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 192 (196i).
"' Id. at 172, 183-87.
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authority. 5 In addition, the opinion examined at length the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act. It concluded that Congress did not
intend the act to apply to municipal corporations, but that in other situa-
tions it was designed to provide a federal remedy, and that the state
remedy need not be first sought and refused before the federal one is
invoked.16
Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, concurred. De-
daring that the evidence of legislative intent relied on by both the
majority and dissent was inherently unsatisfactory, the concurring
opinion maintained that stare decisis required that the Court's prior
interpretation of "under color of" law made in substantially identical
situations under the criminal provisions of the Civil Rights Act should
control.17
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented except as to the dismissal of the
complaint against the City of Chicago.' In a lengthy opinion he urged
that the Court's prior interpretation of "under color of" law was not
based on an adequate examination of legislative history and should not.
be followed.'" He further maintained that it is not the purpose of the
Civil Rights Act to provide a civil remedy in a federal court for un-
authorized acts of state officials when a state remedy is already available20
and that such an interpretation of the act endangers the independence of
the states.2 In addition, he argued that even if the meaning of the
Civil Rights Act is not dear, respect for our federal system requires
that Congress dearly indicate a purpose to invade the province of the
states before the Court is justified in authorizing an alternative federal
remedy.22
The phrase "under color of" law is ambiguous. Clearly, a state
15 Id. at 183-87. See Williams v. United States, 34.1 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
These cases construe "under color of" law as used in 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1958).
"
8 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (196i).
"I1d. at 19z-94. See cases cited in note x5 supra.
" . at 2o. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, however, took the position that the com-
plaint sufficed to raise the issue of whether detention incommunicado for ten hours
violates due process. Id. at 258-59.
"Id. at z2o-z1.
"0 Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the Ku Klux Act was adopted in 1871
before the federal courts had general "federal question" jurisdiction, and that the
prevailing view of the time only sparingly afforded redress in a federal court between
co-citizens of a state. Consequently, Congress might well have intended to provide a
remedy in the federal courts only for authorized acts. Id. at 252-53.
"Id. at 237-40.
'I at 238-44.
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official acting by purported authority of a state law violative of the
federal constitution is acting "under color of" law within the meaning of
the act.23  However, if a state official acts contrary to state law, it is not
so dear from this language alone that he has acted "under color of"
law.24 Arguably, he has not acted "under color of" law, for he has acted
without authorization from state law. On the other hand, since his
official position lends authority to his misconduct and perhaps even
makes it possible, arguably, his misconduct has "color of" law.25 The
practical problem involved in this question of construction is whether
an alternative remedy will be provided in the federal courts for pro-
tection of constitutional rights when a remedy is already available in
the state courts.
For seventy years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 187,
the question of whether the act provided a remedy in the federal courts
when a state remedy was available remained unanswered. Lower fed-
eral courts, initially considering the question, held that the act did not
provide an alternative federal remedy.2 7  Later, several district court
decisions held that despite the availability of a remedy in the state courts,
a supplemental federal remedy was intended.'
2' See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 3i9 U.S. 157 (1943) Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. z68 (1939). See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 255 n.84 (196i) (dis-
senting opinion).
"' It is clear, however, that actions of a state official in the course of his employ-
ment, even if unauthorized by state law, constitute "state action" within the meaning of
the fourteenth amendment. See Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (951)5
Screws v. United States, 3z5 U.S. 91 (1945) ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299
(ig94) 5 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879). Compare the dissent in Screws v.
United States, supra at 147-48, with the dissent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. x67,
238-39 (1961). But see Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904). See
generally Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Anendnent, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 375 (.958).
2' "Certainly the night-time intrusion of the man with a star and a police revolver
is a different phenomenon than the night-time intrusion of a burglar. The aura of
power which a show of authority carries with it has been created by state government."
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 238 (1961) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter).
28 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape, supra note 25, at zxz-
6.
2 Cf. Brawner v. Irvin, 169 Fed. 964 (C.C.N.D. Ga. 1909) (decision on other
grounds); United States v. Jackson, 26 Fed. Cas. 563 (No. 15,459) (C.C.D. Cal.
1874) (construing "under color of" law in the act of 1870).
28 See United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. x94o). An unre-
ported case, United States v. Cowan (E.D. La. 1940), is said to have reached a similar
result. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 215 n.zz (i96i) (dissenting
opinion).
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The first Supreme Court case to decide this question was United
States v. Classic.29 In the Classic case, the Court held that state election
officials acted "under color of" law within the meaning of the act when
they altered ballots in a federal election, in contravention of state law.
In so holding, the Court declared: "Misuse of power, possessed by
virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is
clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken 'under color of'
state law."30 Squarely faced with the problem again in Screws v. United
States,31 a divided Court held that police officers who maliciously as-
saulted a prisoner while making an arrest were acting "under color of"
state law.32  However, a vigorous dissent argued that the Civil Rights
Act did not provide a remedy when a state official was subject to punish-
ment in the state courts.8 The Screws decision was reaffirmed by a
still divided Court in Williams v. United States.34
These Supreme Court decisions are based on an interpretation of
Cunder color of" law as used in the criminal provisions of the Civil
Rights Act. Since the Classic and Screws decisions, several lower federal
courts have extended the Supreme Court's interpretation of "under color
of" law, made within this criminal law context to the civil liability pro-
visions of the Civil Rights Act. 5 Other lower court decisions have taken
a restrictive view of this latter legislation. 6 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Monroe to resolve this conflict."
The Monroe case holds that "under color of" law includes a misuse
of authority in a civil as well as in a criminal action brought under the
29 313 U.S. 299 (194-).
'
0Id. at 326.
11325 U.S. 91 (1945).
'Id. at 107, 114.
23Id. at 148-49. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented on this point.
Although there were other grounds of dissent in Screws, this "under color of" law
ground was the most fundamental.
34 341 U.S. 97 (1951). In Williams, Justices Minton, Frankfurter, and Jackson,
dissented for the same reasons set forth in the Screws dissent.
"See Cohen v. Cahill, 281 F.2d 879 (9 th Cir. 196o ) ; Baldwin v. Morgan, 251
F.zd 780 (5 th Cir. 1958); Lewis v. Brautigam, 227 F.zd 124 (sth Cir. x955); Geach
v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714. (7th Cir. 1953); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d
Cir. 1949); McShane v. Moldovan, 172 F.zd ioi6 (6th Cir. 1949); Burt v. City of
New York, 156 F.zd 791 (2d Cir. 1946); Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.zd
240 ( 3 d Cir. 1945) ; Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
" See Egan v. City of Aurora, z75 F.zd 377 (7th Cir.), rev'd per curiam, 81 Sup.
Ct. 684 (196i) ; Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.zd 418 (8th Cir. 596o); Stift v. Lynch, 267
F.2d z37 ( 7th Cir. 5959).
"'Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (196i).
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Civil Rights Act."' Thus interpreted, the act authorizes an original
civil suit in the federal courts 9 even though a state remedy is available.
Since this case was decided after a more exhaustive analysis of the prob-
lems and legislative history of the act than previous cases, it should
greatly strengthen the Classic and Screws position.
In order to support their positions, both the majority and dissent in
Monroe examined the legislative history of "under color of" law in the
Civil Rights Act.40 If anything, their examinations demonstrated that
the legislators were primarily concerned with other sections of the act,
and did not advert to whether an isolated incident of misuse of authority
was or was not "under color of" law.4' The concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Harlan recognizes this probable oversight, and thus seems the
better reasoned on this point.
For the federal courts to provide a remedy under the Civil Rights
Act when a remedy is available in the state courts will to some extent
interfere in previously exclusive areas of state policymaking. Although
the state civil rights remedy remains unchanged, state policy will become
subordinate to federal policy, since to the extent that litigants resort to
the federal courts, federal remedies will control. Arguably, the neces-
sity for preserving our federal system requires that federal courts not
interfere when a state remedy is available. Even if such federal inter-
ference is justified, perhaps it should be authorized only by dear con-
' sd. at 184-85, ziz n.18. Monroe further holds that 4z U.S.C. § 1983 of the
present Civil Rights Act was not intended to provide a remedy against municipal cor-
porations, id. at 187, and that actions need not be "willful' in order to be actionable
under the civil provisions of the act, id. at 187. In Egan v. City of Aurora, 8i Sup.
Ct. 684 (196i) the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Civil Rights Act does not pro-
vide a remedy against municipal corporations.
"See note 6 supra.
40 To a lesser extent, Classic, Screws, and Williams also examined the congressional
intent behind "under color of" law as used in the Civil Rights Act.
"' The congressional debate on the Ku Klux Act is ambiguous. Senator Trumbull
of Illinois declared: "[A]s the bill [Ku Klux Act] passed the House of Representatives,
it was understood by the members of that body to go no further than to protect persons
in the rights which were guaranteed to them by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and it did not undertake to furnish redress for wrongs done by one person upon
another in any of the States of the Union in violation of their laws, unless he also
violated some law of the United States, nor to punish one person for an ordinary assault
and battery committed on another in a State." CONG. GLOBE, 4 2d Cong., 1st Sess. 579
(187). Mr. Garfield of Ohio declared: "Let me recapitulate briefly its [Ku Klux Act]
provisions. In the first place it throws the protection of the courts of the United States
over the right of every citizen to enjoy all the privileges and immunities secured to
him by the Constitution; and if any of these rights are denied him under color of any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, he may bring his
action for redress in the courts of the United States." Id. at 807.
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gressional intent. Possibly, by placing undue reliance on the protection
offered by the federal Civil Rights Act, some state legislators may even
fail to provide an adequate state remedy.42
On the other hand, the "under color" provisions of the Civil Rights
Act protect federal constitutional rights which by their very nature are
difficult to enforce in the state courts. In fact, the "under color of"
state law requirement necessitates proceeding against a state official who
is clothed with an aura of state authority. As a result, a federal forum
is likely to be more impartial than a state court in proceedings brought
under the act.43  Moreover, even if the state courts are scrupulously
impartial, the state remedy may be inadequate for protecting federal
constitutional rights.44
The Monroe decision does not mean that the Civil Rights Act will
regulate the "quotidian business"45 of every minor state official. Only
rights secured by the United States Constitution and laws are protected
under the act, and while these rights are very important, they encompass
a minor part of an individual's total rights.46  Furthermore, decisions
,2 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 243
(1961).
4' Federal court impartiality was a primary reason the Monroe case was brought in
a federal district court rather than a state court. The Monroes' attorney stated: "The
state judges of Illinois are politically elected; our federal judges are appointed for life,
on good behavior. Thus, the federal judges are relatively more immune to the kinds
of political pressure which frequently are exerted in these controversial cases involving
fundamental civil liberties than are the state judges. I suspect that any realistic trial
lawyer with experience in this kind of litigation anywhere in the country would tend
to agree with me that when a penniless Negro family attempts to sue a politically potent
high ranking police officer who is white, he is more likely to obtain a fair and impartial
trial of his case from a federal judge. The legislative debates on the Act of 1871 make
it clear that this very consideration weighed heavily in the minds of the congressmen
who sponsored this Act." Moore, The Monroe Case, Durham Morning Herald, March
9, 1961, P. 4 A, col. 7.
4" See Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA.
L. REV. 621 (1955); Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights,
39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955). See also Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 242 (196i).
"Monroe v. Pape, supra note 44, at 242 (dissenting opinion).
""Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been
invaded. The fact that a prisoner is assaulted, injured, or even murdered by state
officials does not necessarily mean that he is deprived of any right protected or secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91, 108-09 (1945) (opinion of Douglas, J.). See Byrd v. Sexton, 277 F.2d 418 (8th
Cir. 296o ) ; Deloach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1959) ; United States ex rel.
Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 ( 7th Cir. 1956) ; Egan v. City of Aurora, 174 F.
Supp. 794 (N.D. Ill. 1959), reid per curiam, 8z Sup. Ct. 684 (1961); note 5 supra.
But see Note, The Proper Scope of the Civil Rights Acts, 66 HARv. L. REV. 1285 (953).
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under the act have given broad immunities to certain classes of state
officials.47  Since the applicability of the federal act is limited, respon-
sible state lawmakers should not be deterred from providing adequate
state protection for civil rights.
Monroe reaffirms that "under color of" law within the Civil Rights
Act includes an abuse of position, even if violative of state law. Such
an interpretation of the civil provisions of the act makes available an
original civil action in the federal courts regardless of the availability
of a state remedy. By the very nature of the rights protected under the
act, the federal courts are a more appropriate forum for their enforce-
ment.4 8  Consequently, the Monroe decision is of far-reaching signifi-
cance in insuring adequate protection of federal constitutional rights.
"See, e.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 34 U.S. 367 (195i) (legislators); Stift v.
Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959) (justice of the peace and state's attorney) 5 Ryan
v. Scoggin, 245 F.zd 54 (oth Cir. 1957) (district judge) 5 Miller v. Director, Middle-
town State Hospital, 146 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (director of mental institution).
"See ioo U. PA. L. REv. iz1 (195). See generally Fraenkel, The Function of
the Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
132 (1948); Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 5' Nw. U.L. REV. 407
(x956) 5 Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW
& CONTFMP. PROB. 216 (194.8).
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